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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to document Laudan’s rejection of 
the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative 
naturalism. At one point in the development of his methodological 
thinking, Laudan appealed to pre-analytic intuitions, which might be 
employed to identify episodes in the history of science against which 
theories of scientific methodology are to be tested. However, Laudan 
came to reject this appeal to intuitions, and rejected this entire ap-
proach to the evaluation of a theory of method. This is an important 
stage in the development of his normative naturalist meta-methodol-
ogy. 
Keywords: Epistemic normativity; meta-methodology; method; the-
ory-change. 
1. Introduction 
 What is the relationship between intuition and the theory of epistemic 
normativity? For some, intuition enables us to explore our concept of 
knowledge or justification (e.g. Goldman 2007). For others, intuition serves 
only to identify obvious and uncontroversial items of knowledge (e.g. Korn-
blith 2002, 10–11). For still others, intuition is unable to play an evidential 
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role because it is influenced by philosophically irrelevant factors (e.g. Wein-
berg, Nichols and Stich 2001). In this paper, I consider an episode from the 
recent history of the philosophy of science in which appeal to intuition was 
rejected precisely in order to develop a theory of epistemic normativity. 
 The episode relates to the proposal in the 1970’s of opposing models of 
scientific theory-change by Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan. In the attempt 
to provide a rational account of the dynamics of theory-change, Lakatos 
proposed a methodology of scientific research programmes on which scien-
tists adopt progressive while rejecting non-progressive research programmes 
(Lakatos 1970). To overcome perceived shortcomings with Lakatos’s model, 
Laudan developed an account of scientific research traditions, which he 
combined with a problem-solving model of scientific rationality. To assess 
competing theories of the methodology of science, Lakatos and Laudan both 
saw a need to identify earlier episodes in the history of science against which 
the theories might be tested. For Lakatos, it was the “value judgements” of 
the scientific élite (e.g. Lakatos 1978, 124), while, for Laudan, it was the 
“pre-analytic intuitions” of “scientifically educated people,” that are em-
ployed to identify the episodes.1 
 Serious questions arise in relation to the evidential role that may be 
played by such value-judgements and pre-analytic intuitions. Laudan came 
to recognize that the appeal to intuition is confronted with severe problems. 
Given this, he rejected the appeal to intuitions, and developed instead his 
normative naturalist meta-methodology.2 Thus, Laudan’s development of 
a naturalistic approach to the normative appraisal of methodological crite-
ria formed part of his rejection of the appeal to intuition. In this paper, my 
aim is to document Laudan’s rejection of intuition in the context of his 
proposal of a naturalistic theory of epistemic normativity. Though largely 
historical in substance, the paper has the systematic intent of suggesting 
that appeal to intuition may be avoided in the theory of epistemic norma-
tivity. 
                                                 
1  For discussion of Lakatos’s appeal to value judgements, see (Sankey 2018). 
2  For detailed analysis of Laudan’s normative naturalist meta-methodology, see 
Nola and Sankey (2007, especially section 12.2). 
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2. Laudan and pre-analytic intuitions 
 In 1977, Laudan published Progress and its Problems, in which he pro-
posed a model of scientific theory-change in the attempt to improve upon 
Lakatos’s model of theory-change.3 Like Kuhn and Lakatos, Laudan 
thought that scientific development rests on underlying theoretical struc-
tures which inform research in an area of science for extended periods of 
time. Laudan called these theoretical structures “research traditions.” Like 
Lakatos, Laudan took there to be ‘core’ elements within a research tradi-
tion. But, unlike Lakatos, he allowed that the core elements of a research 
tradition may be modified or replaced over time (1977, 99). Laudan con-
joined his model of theory-change with a novel problem-solving account of 
rationality.4 This involves the idea that science is fundamentally a problem-
solving activity. As such, “the aim of science is to maximize the scope of 
solved empirical problems while minimizing the scope of anomalous and 
conceptual problems” (1977, 66).5 Given this characterization of the aim of 
science, what it is to be rational in science is to act in a way that increases 
the problem-solving effectiveness of a research tradition (1977, 124–5). 
                                                 
3  By starting my discussion of Laudan with Progress and its Problems, I pass over 
his collection of historical essays on theories of method, Science and Hypothesis. The 
reason is that I wish specifically to focus on the transition away from the intuitionist 
meta-methodology that Laudan shared with Lakatos at the time of writing Progress 
and its Problems. For parallels and contrasts between the intuitionism of Laudan 
and Lakatos, see Laudan (1986, especially 124–6). 
4  Though others (e.g., Popper and Kuhn) thought of science as a problem-solving 
activity, Laudan developed this insight into an explicit theory of rationality. 
5  In spelling out the problem-solving conception of rationality, Laudan develops 
a taxonomy of problems (1977, chapters 1 and 2). Empirical problems are substan-
tive questions that arise with respect to the objects in a domain of scientific study. 
Unsolved empirical problems are not solved by any research tradition. A solved 
problem is solved by at least one research tradition. It thereby becomes an anomaly 
for a competing research tradition so long as it is unsolved by the latter tradition. 
By contrast with empirical problems there are conceptual problems, either internal 
ones (e.g. inconsistency, ambiguity or circularity) that arise within a tradition, or 
external ones which arise due to a conflict between a tradition and another theory 
or tradition, a methodological view or even a non-scientific world-view. 
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Though a scientist may pursue a range of theories or traditions, it is rational 
for a scientist to accept the research tradition which displays the highest 
degree of success in solving problems (1977, 109).6 
 Lakatos spoke of value judgements rather than intuitions. By contrast, 
Laudan does explicitly employ the term ‘intuition,’ though he sometimes 
speaks of judgements and convictions as well. He proposes that a model of 
scientific rationality is to be tested against key episodes from the historical 
development of the sciences.7 A number of cases may be specified from the 
history of science about whose rationality or irrationality we have clear 
intuitions. The intuitions which relate to the resulting list of cases give rise 
to a set of “preferred pre-analytic intuitions about scientific rationality” 
(1977, 160). This set of pre-analytic intuitions may serve as touchstone in 
the evaluation of a theory of method or rationality. It is a necessary condi-
tion of adequacy for a theory of method or rationality that it fit with the 
set of pre-analytic intuitions. In a particularist spirit akin to Lakatos, the 
intuitions relate to specific episodes in the history of science.8 Like Lakatos, 
Laudan holds that we have clearer intuitive reactions to particular cases 
than with respect to abstract theories of method or rationality. Unlike Laka-
tos, Laudan takes the intuitions to relate to a small set of cases rather than, 
potentially, the whole history of science. In a further departure from Laka-
tos, Laudan makes no appeal to the judgements of élite scientists. Instead, 
he speaks of “scientifically educated persons” (1977, 160). 
                                                 
6  Laudan usefully distinguishes pursuit from acceptance (1977, 108–10). In the 
context of pursuit, a scientist might explore a promising theory or research tradition 
without being fully committed to it. Acceptance involves a stronger degree of com-
mitment, e.g. taking a theory to be true. 
7  At this stage, Laudan often speaks of a theory of rationality rather than a theory 
of method. However, methodological considerations play a role in his problem-solving 
conception of rationality. For example, an external conceptual problem may arise 
for a tradition if it comes into conflict with an accepted principle of scientific meth-
odology (1977, 57–61). As we shall shortly see, Laudan later takes the view that the 
theory of rationality is to be sharply distinguished from the theory of method. 
8  For analysis of particularist elements of Lakatos’s approach to meta-methodol-
ogy, see my (2018), which brings Lakatos’s approach into contact with the episte-
mological particularism of Roderick Chisholm (1973). 
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 Laudan’s account of the role that intuition may play in the evaluation 
of a theory of method was subject to significant criticism.9 As a result, 
Laudan renounced his intuitionism, ultimately going on to develop a natu-
ralistic meta-methodology instead. In 1986, Laudan published a response to 
a critical paper by Daniel Garber (1986), in which Garber questioned the 
role of the history of science as opposed to that of our own intuitions in the 
evaluation of theories of method. In his response, Laudan replied in conces-
sive spirit to Garber’s objections while at the same time repudiating the 
intuitionist approach he had previously adopted. Laudan raised a number 
of concerns about the appeal to intuitions (1986, 123 ff.). For one thing, he 
points out that if a theory of method is grounded in a set of pre-analytic 
intuitions, the capacity for the theory of method to serve as basis for criti-
cism of those grounding intuitions is severely limited. It would not be pos-
sible to reject the intuitions on the basis of the theory of method, since the 
sole basis for adoption of the theory of method in the first place is its con-
formity with those very intuitions. For another thing, Laudan notes that 
intuitions are not always universally shared with respect to methodological 
questions. Given lack of unanimity with respect to intuition, an appeal to 
specific cases can hardly be expected to resolve disagreement with respect 
to methodological matters. Furthermore, even if there were to be agreement 
in intuition, it is entirely possible that competing theories of method may fit 
with all the same historical cases picked out by the shared intuitions. Having 
presented these and other reasons for rejecting the intuitionist approach, Lau-
dan concludes by indicating that an alternative approach lies “ready to 
hand” (1986, 126). He does nothing at that point to characterize this alter-
native, though it seems likely that he was thinking of the normative natu-
ralist meta-methodology that he went on to develop in subsequent years.10 
                                                 
9  For example, Janet Kourany raises questions about the relevance of the intui-
tions of “scientifically educated persons”: such intuitions may fail to reflect the ra-
tionality of actual science, differ from notions of rationality found at earlier periods 
in the history of science and, given their origin in a person’s science education, po-
tentially constitute evidence that is lacking in neutrality (Kourany 1982, 535–6). 
10  In fact, Laudan refers to a “monograph-length treatment” entitled Science and 
Method on which he was working. So far as I am aware, no such monograph did 
materialize. But papers on normative naturalism start to appear the following year. 
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3. Laudan’s normative naturalism 
 The year after the response to Garber, Laudan’s major articulation of 
the normative naturalist position was published (1987).11 By contrast with 
Progress and its Problems, Laudan now distinguishes sharply between 
a theory of rationality and a theory of method. This is primarily due to the 
fact that the rationality of an action depends on an agent’s aims and back-
ground beliefs, and methodological rules may be employed by scientists in 
an attempt to attain their cognitive aims. It would be inappropriate, there-
fore, to judge the rationality of scientists of an earlier epoch by attempting 
to determine whether they employed the methods which we currently adopt 
to pursue our aims, given that the earlier scientists might have adopted 
neither our methods nor our aims. Equally, a scientist of an earlier period 
might have held substantively very different beliefs from ours. Even if they 
did share our aims, they might have had different beliefs about how to 
achieve those aims, whether or not they shared our methodological views. 
 A sharp distinction between questions of rationality and method brings 
out the fatal flaw in the intuitionist approach to the appraisal of theory of 
method. The attempt to evaluate a theory of method by determining 
whether it counts the actions of an earlier scientist as rational is quite 
wrong-headed. As Laudan notes: 
Because our aims and background beliefs differ from those of past 
scientists, determinations of the rationality of their actions and 
of the soundness of our methodological proposals cannot be col-
lapsed into one and the same process. Rationality is one thing: 
methodological soundness is quite another. (1987, 23) 
                                                 
11  I will not attempt to bring Laudan’s 1984 book, Science and Values, into this 
discussion of the development of his ideas. That would detract from the focus on the 
development of his meta-methodological views. Suffice to say that the reticulated 
model that he presents in Science and Values is primarily designed to provide an 
account of the rational evaluation of variable cognitive aims. There is a closer con-
nection between the reticulated model and normative naturalism than is immediately 
apparent. For the naturalistic approach to the evaluation of methodological rules 
may be readily integrated into the reticulated model. 
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The result of enforcing a sharp distinction between rationality and method 
is that the appraisal of a theory of method comes apart from questions of 
the rationality of past scientists. The problem, now, is how to determine 
the soundness of a theory of method. This is where Laudan’s turn to natu-
ralism comes in. 
 The key to Laudan’s naturalistic approach is the suggestion that the 
rules of method may be construed as hypothetical imperatives. Specifically, 
Laudan proposes that a rule of method has the form, “If one’s goal is y, 
then one ought to do x” (1987, 24), where the goal is a cognitive or scientific 
goal, and what one ought to do is to employ some proposed method or 
procedure. This construal of the logical form of a rule of scientific method 
has the decided advantage of making empirical considerations relevant to 
the appraisal of methods. For a rule of method now rests on a substantive 
empirical claim to the effect that the employment of a specific method will 
lead to the realization of a specific desired cognitive or scientific end. Such 
a claim may be true or false, depending on how the world in fact is. More-
over, it is in principle possible to obtain empirical evidence for the truth or 
falsity of the empirical claim embedded in the rule of method. The upshot 
is that it is possible to provide empirical evidence of the extent to which 
a rule of method is an effective means of attaining a desired cognitive end. 
 On the intuitionist approach, a theory of method is to be evaluated in 
terms of whether it reveals selected episodes in the history of science as 
rational. Laudan now rejects both the appeal to intuition and the role of 
rational reconstruction in the appraisal of method. Nevertheless, the history 
of science continues to play a crucial role in determining the soundness of 
a rule of method. For, rather than appeal to intuition or the rationality of 
past scientists, the appraisal of a methodological rule now turns on the 
empirical question of whether use of the rule conduces to its purported aim. 
This is an empirical matter which turns on historical matters of fact. Inves-
tigation of the history of past science may reveal whether or not utilization 
of a specific rule of scientific method has in fact led to the realization of the 
aim to which it was thought to lead. Thus, even while rejecting the intui-
tionist appeal to past science, Laudan’s normative naturalist meta-method-
ology accords history of science a crucial role in the appraisal of rules of 
method. 
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 Laudan’s approach to the empirical appraisal of rules of method is 
strongly naturalistic precisely in virtue of the way it treats the appraisal of 
the rules of method as an empirical matter. But such a naturalistic approach 
does not render epistemological questions a matter of descriptive psychology 
in the manner at one point seemingly suggested by Quine.12 Rather, Lau-
dan’s naturalism is a normative naturalism on which the rules of method 
have normative force. They convey normative force because their employ-
ment does in fact conduce to desired cognitive ends. A scientist whose belief 
or theory-choice conforms with such rules thereby possesses epistemic war-
rant with respect to the belief or theory-choice precisely in virtue of their 
conforming with rules that lead to desired cognitive ends. Thus, Laudan’s 
normative naturalist meta-methodology constitutes a strongly naturalistic 
epistemological theory about the basis of the epistemically normative force 
of the rules of scientific method. 
4. Conclusion 
 In this short paper I have sought to document how critical reflection on 
the role of intuition contributed to the turn to normative naturalism in the 
work of Larry Laudan. As we have seen, Laudan was critical of the role 
that might be played by intuition in relation to the theory of scientific 
method and the rationality of science. At one level, this is a historical point 
in relation to the development of Laudan’s methodological thought. At an-
other level, the lessons of this episode seem to me to have significant nega-
tive implications for the appeal to intuition in the context of a theory of 
epistemic normativity. 
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